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I. Introduction
A long-running debate in financial economics
concerns the possible effect of investor sentiment
on asset prices. For example, respected research-
ers have entered on both sides of the argument as
to whether the stock price run-up and subsequent
market collapse of 1929 was rational or not (see
DeLong and Shleifer 1991 and White 1990). Per-
haps ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ (Shiller 2000) drove
prices above fundamental values. More recently,
some commentators have suggested the rapid rise
and fall of technology stocks was due to exces-
sively bullish sentiments that started returning to
more typical levels in spring 2000. Indeed, even
before the massive devaluation of technology
stocks, Malkiel (1999) wrote, ‘‘The spreading phi-
losophy of the day traders that ‘fundamentals don’t
matter’ may well have contributed to valuations
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These results are robust
to the inclusion of other
variables that have been
shown to forecast stock
returns.
of Internet stocks that can only be described in terms of a financial
bubble.’’
The existence of systematic mispricing in the market remains con-
tentious because of the difficulty in examining the issue empirically.1
The absence of precise valuation models for stocks makes it difficult to
measure deviations from theoretical prices. Similar problems arise from
the difficulty in measuring investor sentiment.
Several recent papers identify examples that are difficult to reconcile
with rational pricing. Lamont and Thaler (2001) examine 3Com’s spin-
off of Palm. In this transaction, the market valuations of the companies
implied the 3Com ‘‘stub’’ (a 3Com share less the claim on Palm) was
$63, a violation of the law of one price. Rashes (2001) discusses the
heavy trading in Massmutual Corporate Investors (ticker MCI) around
Worldcom’s acquisition of MCI Communications (ticker MCIC). Ap-
parently, these investors were unable to determine the correct ticker
symbol and mistakenly placed trades in Massmutual, and their trad-
ing drove the price away from its intrinsic value. Ofek and Richardson
(2001) discuss a variety of examples from the Internet sector in devel-
oping a ‘‘strong, circumstantial case against market efficiency.’’ While
these papers provide interesting evidence of misvaluation, they are spe-
cific to either a few companies or an industry that is admittedly dif-
ficult to value. Our focus in this paper is at the level of broad market
indices.
We shed new light on the issue of investor rationality by bringing new
data and techniques to the question. Specifically, we use a direct sur-
vey measure of investor sentiment instead of relying on other proxies
such as closed-end fund discounts (see Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 1991;
Swaminathan 1996; and Neal and Wheatley 1998). Perhaps the most
important distinction between our paper and most prior research is that
our empirical tests concentrate on relating sentiment levels directly to
stock price deviations from fundamental value and on the long-run ef-
fects of sentiment on stock returns.2 Shanken and Tamayo (2001) pro-
vide evidence of expected return predictability that is unrelated to risk.
They characterize this predictability as being due to mispricing. Their
analysis uses a slow-moving variable (the dividend yield) as the con-
ditioning information, implying that mispricing may be a long-horizon
phenomenon.
Intuitively, looking at the relation between long-run market returns
and sentiment is appealing for two reasons. First, it seems natural to
1. See Fama (1998) for a recent review from the rational camp or Hirshleifer (2001) for a
review from the behavioral side.
2. Solt and Statman (1988), Clarke and Statman (1998), Otoo (1999), Fisher and Statman
(2000), and Brown and Cliff (2004) also use survey data but focus on the short-run im-
plications. Neal and Wheatley (1998) do long-horizon regressions but use proxies for
sentiment.
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view sentiment as a persistent variable. People become more optimistic
as they are reinforced by others joining on the bandwagon. Thus, the
importance of sentiment may build over time. Second, arbitrage forces
are likely to eliminate short-run mispricing but may break down at longer
horizons. Two examples of the limits to arbitrage are the noise trader risk
of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, andWaldmann (1990; hereafter DSSW)
and the interaction of agency costs and capital constraints in Shleifer
and Vishny (1997). Indeed, sentiment appears to have little predictive
power for subsequent near-term returns (see the papers cited in note 2).
This result is not surprising, since short-run predictability would lead
to a simple trading strategy generating abnormal returns. However, the
lack of predictability in the short run does not imply that sentiment has
no affect on prices. Sentiment may drive asset prices away from intrin-
sic value for extended periods of time, yet this would be difficult to de-
tect over short horizons (see Summers 1986). Whether sentiment does
affect asset valuations in this way is an important open question we ad-
dress in this paper.
We test two main hypotheses. The first is that excessive optimism
leads to periods of market overvaluation. If so, this leads to the second
hypothesis, that high current sentiment is followed by low cumulative
long-run returns as the market price reverts to its intrinsic value. If the
price correction were quick and predictable, there would be a potentially
profitable trading strategy. However, a gradual correction over some un-
known horizon is possible if there are limits to arbitrage. For example,
an arbitrageur may believe with high confidence that the market is over-
valued but be unwilling to take a short position for fear the market may
become more overvalued before reverting to its intrinsic value. Fre-
quent performance evaluation exacerbates this problem, since investors
may withdraw capital precisely at the time when it is needed to meet
margin calls.
To test our first hypothesis, we relate the level of sentiment to market
mispricing as proxied by the Dow Jones Industrial Average pricing
errors from Bakshi and Chen (2001). Estimating the relation between
sentiment and mispricing is econometrically challenging because both
time series are highly persistent. We undertake two types of tests, each
of which yields similar conclusions in support of the hypothesis that
sentiment is related to market mispricing. The first test uses the level
of sentiment to explain pricing errors. We find a significantly posi-
tive coefficient on the sentiment variable, indicating the market is over-
valued during periods of optimism. A second test treats the market and
model valuations as a cointegrated system. Sentiment is a significant ex-
planatory variable in the error correction version of the cointegrating
regression. That is, after controlling for changes in fundamental value
and the error-correction adjustment toward equilibrium, sentiment is
positively related to changes in market valuations. Both sets of tests are
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robust to controlling for other factors predicting market returns (e.g.,
past returns, dividend yield, Fama-French factors).
In the test of our second hypothesis, we find that sentiment is in fact
significantly related to long-run stock returns in the manner predicted.
Specifically, high levels of sentiment result in significantly lower returns
over the next 2 or 3 years. While this effect is present for the aggregate
stockmarket, it is concentrated in large-capitalization growth stocks. The
economic significance of this result is also plausible. For example, a one
standard deviation (bullish) shock to sentiment results in a predicted 7%
underperformance of the market over the next 3 years. These results are
robust to inclusion of the control variables and the econometric issues
related to overlapping observations.
Together these three tests provide strong and consistent support for
the hypothesis that asset values are affected by investor sentiment. Each
of the tests provides both statistically and economically significant re-
sults, all pointing in the same direction. Namely, overly optimistic (pes-
simistic) investors drive prices above (below) fundamental values and
these pricing errors tend to revert over a multi-year horizon. This pattern
is consistent with the predictions of many behavioral models that prices
underreact in the short run and overreact in the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some motivation for the paper and our approach. Section III
discusses the data. The next two sections contain our main analysis.
Section IV covers the long-horizon regressions and section Vexamines
the relation between sentiment and the mispricing implied by the Bakshi
and Chen (2001) model. In section VI, we present a number of ro-
bustness checks and comparisons to other empirical findings using al-
ternative sentiment proxies. Section VII concludes the paper, and an
appendix contains the details of the simulation used with the long-
horizon regressions.
II. Motivation
In this section, we develop our hypotheses by discussing an environ-
ment where sentiment can affect asset valuation. Our approach makes
threemain assumptions. First, we assume that a subset of investors makes
biased asset valuations. Second, we assume that this bias is persistent.
Finally, we assume that limits to arbitrage hinder the exploitation of as-
set mispricing. These assumptions lead to an environment where market
prices can differ from intrinsic value for protracted periods of time. Ex-
cessive optimism leads to overvaluation of assets. Arbitrage forces can
eliminate profitable short-term trading strategies but not longer run mis-
pricing. Over longer horizons, the high sentiment that leads to over-
valuation would be associated with low long-run returns as asset prices
revert to intrinsic values.
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We begin by partitioning the universe of investors into two groups.
The first group, which we can think of as rational investors, we refer to
as fundamentalists. This group has the property that they make an un-
biased assessment of an asset’s intrinsic value. The second group of
investors are swayed by episodes of excessive optimism or pessimism.
For convenience, we refer to this group as speculators. As a group, they
tend to overvalue assets during times of extreme optimism or high
sentiment. When their sentiment is especially low, the group tends to
undervalue assets.
Intuitively, we can think of the market price of an asset as reflecting a
weighted average of the valuations of these two groups. More formally,
this can come from a model such as Litner (1969). In that model, the
heterogeneous judgments of investors aggregate to form market prices
as we describe. Our setup amounts to a way of partitioning the investor
universe in the Lintner model. In particular, for a set of assets in unit
supply, the vector of asset prices is
P ¼ 1
Rf
wS KS  a6ið Þ þ wF KF  a6ið Þ½  ¼ wSPS þ wFPF ð1Þ
where Rf is the gross riskless return, a is the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion, 6 is the belief of the variance-covariance matrix of asset
returns, and Ki is the belief of the vector of asset payoffs (i ¼ S for the
speculators and F for the fundamentalists). We focus on the simplest
case, where both types of investors have identical risk aversion and es-
timates of 6 but different expectations of asset payoffs.3
Under these assumptions, the weights wS and wF are determined by
the fraction of investors that are speculators versus fundamentalists.
Clearly, if there are any speculators in the market and KS > KF , then
P > PF. Interpreting the fundamentalists as properly valuing the assets,
this says the market price is above fundamentals when the speculators
are overoptimistic. Our point in introducing this model is not to take it
literally but just to show that the simple idea we posit is supported by
formal models.
One question that arises is how the speculators can survive if they
systematically misvalue assets. Here, we appeal to the limits to arbi-
trage. In the context of DSSW, our fundamentalists may recognize the
market is overvalued but still be unwilling to try to exploit the mis-
pricing. For example, portfolio managers may be evaluated annually, so
they would be unwilling to take a position that may take longer to pay
off. There is no pure arbitrage opportunity, since it is unknownwhen the
market prices will converge back to the intrinsic value. Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) show how agency problems between an arbitrageur and
3. Generalizing to allow differences in risk aversion or covariance estimates complicates
the algebra but the important features remain.
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his or her source of capital can also hinder arbitrage. In their model, if
a position moves against the arbitrageur, the investors withdraw some
capital. But this is precisely when the arbitrageur needs capital to meet
margin calls. The arbitrageur is potentially forced to liquidate the po-
sition at a loss, even though the expected return is even more attractive
than when the position was initiated.
There are two main implications of the environment we describe.
First, we should see market overvaluation when sentiment is high. The
second implication is that, as the market price reverts to its intrinsic
value, long-horizon returns following periods of high sentiment should
be abnormally low. These predictions are a common thread in many
models. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) are two examples, although they have exogenous noise
or sentiment traders. Several recent behavioral models model the source of
noise more formally. In Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998),
investors are overconfident about their private signals and they incor-
rectly attribute successful outcomes to their own abilities while blaming
bad outcomes on chance (‘‘biased self-attribution’’). Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998) have a model where earnings are a random walk, but
investors mistakenly believe earnings switch between a mean-reverting
regime and a growth regime. The investors are slow to update their
beliefs about the regime in the face of new evidence (‘‘conservatism’’).
At the same time, these investors think they see patterns where none
exist (‘‘representativeness’’). Hong and Stein (1999) posit two groups
of boundedly rational agents, ‘‘newswatchers’’ and ‘‘momentum trad-
ers.’’ Newswatchers get private signals but ignore information inmarket
prices. Slow transmittal of information causes prices to underreact in the
short run. This underreaction leads to trading by the momentum investors.
Overreaction results when the momentum investors have gone too far.
The primary aim of our paper is not to distinguish one of these
theories from another. Instead, our goal is to evaluate the broad pre-
dictions of behavioral theories relative to the null of rational pricing.
Where appropriate, we make connections to specific behavioral models.
In the analyses to follow we present three main tests of these implica-
tions. In each case, we find strong support of these hypotheses. The tests
are robust to controlling for rational factors that may be correlated with
sentiment and to modifications to the methodology.
III. Data
The results in the paper are based on a sample of monthly data. For
the long-horizon regressions, the data start in January 1963 and end in
December 2000 for a total of 456 observations. The analysis involving
pricing errors is limited to the shorter sample of 235 observations from
January 1979 to July 1998.
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A. Sentiment
A key variable used in the analysis is survey data on investor senti-
ment, denoted St . These data are from Investor’s Intelligence
4 (II),
which tracks the number of market newsletters that are bullish, bear-
ish, or neutral. Currently, II categorizes approximately 130 market
newsletters, although this number has apparently changed somewhat
through time as market newsletters have come into or gone out of favor.
Each newsletter is read and marked as bullish, bearish, or neutral based
on the expectation of future market movements. Since the newsletters
are not written with the survey in mind, they may differ somewhat in
forecast horizon and thus may require interpretation in the categoriza-
tion. Investors Intelligence indicates that a relatively small number of
people are involved in categorizing the newsletters, so there should not
be a large problem associated with differing interpretations. The sen-
timent data begin in 1963 with biweekly surveys. In 1969, the survey
became weekly. We sample the series at month end, because a majority
of the newsletters surveyed are published only monthly. On average,
43.8% of newsletters surveyed are bullish and 32.9% are bearish. The
typical interpretation of the sentiment survey is as a contrarian indicator:
When sentiment is unusually bullish, the market is predicted to expe-
rience below-average subsequent returns. For example, in a recent
Forbes interview5 with Michael Burke, editor of II, he stated:
‘‘Most [newsletters] are trend followers. . . . If you go back to the end
of 1994, when the Dow was at 3,700, people were very pessimistic . We
had two weeks in a row with 59% bears on our chart, the most bears in
12 and a half years. Meanwhile, the market was just getting ready to take
off on a five-year rise. In August 1987, however, two months before the
crash, the sentiment was overly optimistic, with bulls over 61% and the
bears at 19%. So we look at this indicator in a contrarian way.’’
Our preferred sentiment variable is the bull-bear spread, a common
measure of sentiment in the popular press.6 It is defined as the per-
centage of newsletters bullish minus the percentage bearish. Summary
statistics for the bull-bear spread (St) over the two relevant sample
periods are in table 1 and the series is plotted in figure 1. Our choice of
using the bull-bear spread as a measure of sentiment does not drive our
results. As we discuss in section VI, our results are robust to alternative
variables using the Bull /Bear/Neutral data.
Inspection of the sentiment data reveals some interesting features.
First, sentiment is quite variable: Readings greater or less than 20 in
magnitude make up 43% of observations, although the most extreme
4. Chartcraft (www.chartcraft.com) provides the data on a subscription basis.
5. See Forbes.com, March 19, 2002.
6. For example, the bull-bear spread is published weekly inBarron’s and is oftenmentioned
in financial press articles.
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readings occur in the first half of the sample (the standard deviation
decreases from 25.7 in the first half of the sample to 17.0 in the second
half ). The second important feature is sentiment’s strong persistence,
with first-order autocorrelation of about 0.7. This is an intuitively pleas-
ing characteristic, insofar as it suggests investors are not too fickle and
bouts of optimism or pessimismmay reinforce themselves. Finally, sen-
timent is strongly correlated with contemporaneous market returns but
is not useful in predicting subsequent near-term returns.7
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Skewness Ex Kurt R1 Rs;i
A. 456 Observations from 1/1963 to 12/2000
S 10.8890 22.0475 .0428 .3606 .7110 1.0000
RFx .0037 .0989 .1284 3.2788 .7755 .2406
HB3 .0717 .1013 2.3729 10.1190 .3265 .1202
TS 1.2339 1.2952 .1419 .3162 .9316 .2485
DS 1.0073 .4529 1.1951 1.2728 .9711 .0302
DY 3.2349 .9970 .0703 .2224 .9865 .2579
Infl .3845 .3041 .9932 1.6812 .6468 .2815
ExMkt .5280 4.3997 .5107 2.3572 .0416 .2828
SMB .1596 3.2425 .5493 5.8565 .0956 .1822
HML .4210 2.8878 .0149 2.0385 .1657 .0126
UMD .9276 3.6184 .0375 3.3080 .0392 .0039
B. 235 Observations from 1/1979 to 7/1998
S 7.1694 18.4963 .0171 .4220 .7059 1.0000
RFx .0055 .1189 .0562 2.2936 .7570 .2634
HB3 .0856 .1186 2.2201 8.0713 .3666 .1006
TS 1.6073 1.4289 .6903 .1779 .9272 .2104
DS 1.1466 .4912 1.0046 .5091 .9656 .1016
DY 3.3521 1.0210 .0320 .6550 .9873 .2909
Infl .3743 .3130 1.0573 1.3300 .7631 .3221
ExMkt .8067 4.2627 .8068 3.9041 .0270 .3068
SMB .0008 2.5002 .0369 .6324 .1441 .1402
HML .3631 2.5691 .1598 .3153 .1930 .0599
UMD .9203 3.1796 .1080 2.0910 .0989 .0173
p  p* .0040 .1117 .1062 .3174 .8834 .2044
RDOW 1.7008 4.2046 .4424 2.7785 .0279 .2429
Note.—Panel A contains summary statistics for sentiment and the control variables used in the long-
horizon regressions. Panel B contains the summary statistics for sentiment, the log pricing error on the
‘‘quasi-Dow’’ ( p  p*), and the monthly return on the quasi-Dow (RDOW) for a shorter subsample.
Panel B data are used in the pricing error regressions and cointegration regressions. The quasi-Dow is a
value-weighted index we create using all available firms for which Bakshi and Chen (2001) have
pricing errors. The variables are sentiment (S), the detrended interest rate (RFx), the difference in re-
turns on 3- and 1-month T-bills (HB3), term spread (TS), default spread (DS), inflation ( Infl), the
Fama and French (1993) factors (ExMkt, SMB, and HML), and a momentum factor (UMD). See the
text for additional variable descriptions.
7. Brown and Cliff (2004) find that both recent market returns and prior sentiment read-
ings are important predictors of sentiment levels and changes. While they document a strong
positive contemporaneous correlation between sentiment and market returns, they find no
evidence of profitable short-run trading strategies.
#04463 UCP: JB article # 780201
412 Journal of Business
B. Dependent Variables
For the long-horizon regressions, we cumulate monthly log returns over
various horizons. We use the 25 Fama and French (1993) portfolios
formed on the basis of size and book/market sorts, in addition to the
5 portfolios from univariate size sorts, the 5 portfolios from univariate
book/market sorts, and the overall market portfolio.8 This collection of
36 portfolios allows an opportunity to see if predictability due to sen-
timent is affected by the size or value effects. Table 2 contains summary
statistics for the 36 portfolios. In our sample, the value (high book/
market) stocks had higher average returns and lower standard devia-
tions than growth ( low book/market) stocks. Small stocks generally
had high average returns, high standard deviations, and large positive
autocorrelations.
In the pricing error analysis, we have data from Bakshi and Chen
(2001), who derive and estimate a discounted cash flow model with
mean-reverting processes for earnings growth and interest rates. We use
their pricing errors for each of the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial
Fig. 1.—Pricing errors and sentiment. This figure shows the pricing error on the
‘‘quasi-Dow’’ index and investor sentiment, measured as percentages. The quasi-
Dow is a value-weighted index we create using all available firms for which Bakshi
and Chen (2001) have pricing errors. Sentiment data are monthly from 1963
through 2000. Pricing errors start in January 1979 and end in July 1998.
8. We thank Ken French for providing these data and the SMB, HML, and UMD factors.
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Average (DJIA) as of July 1998.9 As the composition of the Dow has
changed over time, the stocks for which we have pricing errors do not
exactly represent the actual DJIA. In addition, not all the pricing errors
are available back to January 1979. Consequently, we form an index,
which we call the quasi-Dow, that uses the available stocks from this
group. In particular, for each month, we value-weight the pricing errors
on the stocks with pricing errors in that month. We also calculate the
returns on this value-weighted index. The returns and pricing error se-
ries are then used to determine the log level of the market’s valuation
( p) and the log valuation level according to the Bakshi and Chen (2001)
model ( p*). The working assumption is that the model valuation is a
proxy for the intrinsic value of the index, and the market’s deviation
from this intrinsic value is a pricing error. It is possible, of course,
that the ‘‘pricing error’’ p  p* is actually model misspecification, not
TABLE 2 Returns Summary Statistics
Low BM 2 BM 3 BM 4 High All
A. Means
Small .7807 1.2724 1.3053 1.5025 1.6061 1.1995
Size 2 .8984 1.1530 1.3927 1.4536 1.5312 1.2288
Size 3 .9240 1.2557 1.2338 1.3820 1.5423 1.1982
Size 4 1.0742 1.0184 1.2598 1.4314 1.4682 1.1646
Large 1.0390 1.0043 1.0402 1.1479 1.2169 1.0252
All 1.0096 1.0181 1.1026 1.2738 1.4126 1.0352
B. Standard Deviations
Small 8.0397 6.9855 6.0499 5.6533 5.8785 6.2894
Size 2 7.3342 5.9717 5.3282 5.0690 5.6048 5.8295
Size 3 6.7469 5.4185 4.9084 4.6638 5.2517 5.3003
Size 4 5.9466 5.1468 4.8414 4.5864 5.3428 4.9721
Large 4.7450 4.5314 4.3135 4.2734 4.5935 4.2223
All 4.9110 4.5888 4.2527 4.2147 4.7004 4.3795
C. Autocorrelations
Small .2128 .1813 .1861 .2000 .2359 .2179
Size 2 .1399 .1559 .1658 .1514 .1360 .1513
Size 3 .1055 .1424 .1384 .1455 .1403 .1283
Size 4 .0757 .1031 .0668 .0665 .0375 .0752
Large .0256 .0077 .0566 .0556 .0136 .0175
All .0487 .0487 .0033 .0120 .0746 .0352
Note.—This table shows the summary statistics for monthly returns on portfolios formed on size and
book /market values. Portfolio formation follows the Fama and French (1993) procedure. Portfolios in
the row labeled All are univariate book /market sorts. Portfolios in the All column are univariate size
sorts. The portfolio in the All row and All column contains all available firms. These portfolios are used
in the long-horizon regression by converting to multiperiod log returns. There are 456 observations
from January 1963 through December 2000.
9. We thank Gurdip Bakshi and Zhiwu Chen for providing these data.
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mispricing. However, we present evidence that this does not seem to be
the predominant explanation for our results.10
Figure 2 shows the (log) valuations for the market and the model.
Both clearly move together over the long run, but there are substantial
deviations for a year or more. Figure 1 shows the percentage pricing
error along with the level of sentiment. The pricing errors make per-
sistent swings around zero. The average pricing error is near zero, and
the summary statistics in panel B of table 1 show that it is volatile and
persistent. Figure 3 shows some properties of the pricing error and its
relation to sentiment in the frequency domain. Panel A is the spectral
Fig. 2.—Market and model valuations. This figure shows the logs of the market
valuation for the quasi-Dow ( p) and the corresponding intrinsic value from the
Bakshi and Chen (2001) model ( p*). The quasi-Dow is a value-weighted index
we create using all available firms for which Bakshi and Chen (2001) have pricing
errors. Data are monthly from January 1979 through July 1998.
10. We choose the Bakshi and Chen (2001) pricing errors because we feel they provide
the best measure, considering the available sample size and reasonableness of the pricing
errors. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) also model the intrinsic value of the Dow.
However, their model assumes constant expected excess returns, which opens the possibility
that measured pricing errors are due to true time-variation in risk premia. Since expected
returns enter into the valuation equation nonlinearly, simply adding control variables in a
linear regression may not be adequate. Also, their model does not pass our diagnostics tests.
Specifically, we find that their intrinsic value measure reacts to sentiment. For our purposes, a
good measure of intrinsic value should not respond to sentiment. Sharpe (2002) values the
S&P 500 beginning in 1983. Results using his pricing error series are very similar to our
main results. See section VI. D for further details.
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Fig. 3.—Frequency domain representation. Panel A plots the spectral density of
the pricing error p  p* for the quasi-Dow index. It shows the importance of var-
ious frequencies in the variation of p p*. Panel B shows the cospectrum of p p*
and sentiment, which indicates the importance of various frequencies in the co-
variation between the two series.
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density of p  p* over various frequencies. This shows that most of the
variability in the pricing errors is due to movements over the 2- to 4-year
horizon, consistent with the swings in the pricing errors shown in figure 1
lasting for several years. Panel B of figure 3 shows the cospectrum of
p  p* and St. This can be thought of as showing the comovement
between the two series at various horizons. The plot indicates that most
of the comovement comes from the 2-year horizon. The negative values
around the 4-year horizon are consistent with a reversal correcting prior
valuation errors. Although the figures do not provide formal tests that
optimism (pessimism) drives market overvalutions (undervaluations),
they are consistent with this interpretation.
C. Control Variables
To interpret our results as sentiment influencing future market valu-
ations, we need to control for the information our sentiment variable
may contain about rational factors. Indeed, our sentiment variable par-
tially contains rational expectations based on risk factors and other var-
iables that have been shown to predict future performance.When people
say they are bullish on the market, this can be a rational reflection of
prosperous times to come, an irrational hope for the future, or some
combination of the two. We want to focus on the irrational part of sen-
timent, so we include a set of control variables designed to capture this
rational predictability. We acknowledge that we might be missing some
important rational factor, but we feel our set of control variables is a rea-
sonable effort in mitigating this problem.
Our set of control variables are motivated by the conditional asset
pricing literature. We use the stochastically detrended 1-month U.S.
Treasury bill return (RFx; Campbell 1991; Hodrick 1992), the differ-
ence inmonthly returns on 3-month and1-month T-bills (HB3; Campbell
1987; Ferson and Harvey 1991), the term spread as measured by the
spread in yields on the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond vs. the 3-month
T-bill (TS; Fama and French 1989), the default spread measured as the
difference in yields on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds (DS; Keim and
Stambaugh 1986 or Fama 1990), the dividend yield for the value-
weighted CRSP index over the past twelve months (DY; Fama and
French 1988; Campbell and Shiler 1988a, 1988b), and the rate of in-
flation (Infl; Fama and Schwert 1977; Sharpe 2002).
In addition to these variables, we include several of the popular
factors in asset pricing models. Specifically, we also include the excess
return on the value-weighted market portfolio, the premium on a port-
folio of small stocks relative to large stocks (SMB), the premium on a
portfolio of high book/market stocks relative to low book/market stocks
(HML), and the premium on a portfolio of past winners relative to losers
(UMD). The market factor is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
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while Fama and French (1993) show the SMB and HML factors are
incrementally useful. The momentum factor is based on Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the control variables. The last
column of the table shows the correlation with sentiment. Several of the
variables have correlations of 0.2 or higher (in magnitude) with senti-
ment, but none is larger than 0.33. Therefore, it appears that sentiment
does share common information with the control variables but may also
contain incremental information.
IV. Sentiment and Long-Horizon Returns
Our first step in examining the impact of investor sentiment on asset
valuations is to regress future k-period log returns on sentiment and the
control variables (zt),
rtþ1 þ    þ rtþkð Þ=k ¼ a kð Þ þ0
0
kð Þzt þ b kð ÞSt þ " kð Þt : ð2Þ
As the length of the horizon increases, the number of observations in the
regression drops, as does the number of independent observations.
The term b(k) indicates the sensitivity of expected monthly returns
over the horizon to investor sentiment. Under the null hypothesis that as-
set valuations are not influenced by behavioral forces, sentiment should
not enter the regression significantly. Under the alternative hypothesis
that optimism drives asset values above fundamental values and prices
subsequently correct, b should be negative. Current optimism results in
overvaluation, so future returns over the horizon would be lower than
normal as the market valuation returns to its intrinsic value.
It turns out that careful implementation of this simple test is com-
plicated. Long-horizon regressions are plagued by several econometric
problems. The process of cumulating monthly returns, then running a
regression with overlapping observations generates strong correlation
in the residuals. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) provide standard errors that
correct for this problem, but this correction does not perform well in
finite samples (see Richardson and Stock 1989; Richardson and Smith
1991; Hodrick 1992; or Boudoukh and Richardson 1994). A second
problem is that the inclusion of persistent independent variables can bias
the coefficient estimates since they are predetermined but not strictly
exogenous (see Stambaugh 1999). To circumvent these problems we
use a bootstrap simulation. Details of the simulation are provided in the
appendix. In short, the simulation allows us to correct for the bias and use
the appropriate critical values for inferences.
The results from the long-horizon regressions are collected in tables 3
through 6. Each table contains four panels, corresponding to horizons
of 6, 12, 24, or 36 months. Within each panel are the results for each of
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the 36 portfolios, estimated separately. Table 3 reports the bias-adjusted
coefficient estimates. They are almost universally negative as predicted
by the alternative hypothesis and tend to be most negative for the larger
firms and low book/market (growth) firms. A comparison of the panels
shows that coefficients for horizons of a year or more are almost always
more negative than those for the 6-month horizon. This pattern is con-
sistent with limits to arbitrage hindering the ability of investors from
profiting on mispricing that might persist for a significant amount of
time.
TABLE 3 Sentiment Coefficient in Long-Horizon Regressions
Low BM 2 BM 3 BM 4 High All
A. 6-Month Horizon
Small .0042 .0115 .0114 .0069 .0088 .0073
Sz 2 .0158 .0126 .0141 .0110 .0079 .0170
Sz 3 .0197 .0149 .0085 .0094 .0080 .0159
Sz 4 .0144 .0124 .0096 .0058 .0057 .0123
Big .0125 .0127 .0066 .0057 .0071 .0083
All .0130 .0135 .0076 .0052 .0060 .0067
B. 12-Month Horizon
Small .0053 .0117 .0113 .0083 .0093 .0081
Sz 2 .0137 .0112 .0125 .0119 .0087 .0129
Sz 3 .0157 .0115 .0090 .0107 .0102 .0127
Sz 4 .0142 .0118 .0105 .0087 .0082 .0122
Big .0155 .0143 .0089 .0109 .0096 .0130
All .0153 .0143 .0093 .0094 .0083 .0110
C. 24-Month Horizon
Small .0033 .0035 .0029 .0022 .0016 .0004
Sz 2 .0066 .0031 .0037 .0046 .0017 .0039
Sz 3 .0076 .0053 .0027 .0032 .0043 .0048
Sz 4 .0102 .0081 .0053 .0034 .0027 .0069
Big .0134 .0133 .0070 .0066 .0094 .0114
All .0122 .0119 .0063 .0045 .0050 .0088
D. 36-Month Horizon
Small .0073 .0009 .0010 .0006 .0005 .0020
Sz 2 .0029 .0013 .0020 .0038 .0005 .0018
Sz 3 .0056 .0044 .0029 .0023 .0012 .0035
Sz 4 .0095 .0074 .0060 .0032 .0015 .0065
Big .0145 .0136 .0079 .0069 .0082 .0122
All .0129 .0118 .0070 .0046 .0037 .0092
Note.—This table shows the coefficients on sentiment from regression of k-period log returns on
lagged predictive variables. Explanatory variables are a constant, RFx, HB3, TS, DS, DY, Infl, ExMkt,
SMB, HML, UMD, and sentiment. The full data set is 456 observations from 1/1963 to 12/2000. Each
panel has k fewer observations due to construction of long-horizon returns. The reported coefficients are
bias-adjusted from a simulation. See the appendix for additional details.
rtþ1 þ    þ rtþkð Þ=k ¼ a kð Þ þ00 kð Þzt þ b kð ÞSt þ " kð Þt
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Table 4 gauges the statistical significance of the sentiment variable.11
These p-values are based on the empirical distributions obtained from
the simulation. The test statistic is constructed as the bias-adjusted co-
efficient divided by the standard deviation (across simulations) of
the coefficient estimate. We find these statistics adhere very closely
to the standard normal distribution (panel A of figure 4 provides an
TABLE 4 Significance of Sentiment in Long-Horizon Regressions
Low BM 2 BM 3 BM 4 High All
A. 6-Month Horizon
Small .7873 .3910 .3125 .5169 .4372 .5476
Sz 2 .2522 .2552 .1601 .2429 .4347 .1223
Sz 3 .1105 .1432 .3641 .2820 .4158 .1022
Sz 4 .1866 .1969 .2661 .4786 .5314 .1655
Big .1349 .1034 .3311 .4140 .3628 .2260
All .1414 .0936 .2910 .4636 .4732 .3595
B. 12-Month Horizon
Small .6514 .2371 .1843 .2905 .2650 .3755
Sz 2 .1857 .1670 .0989 .0927 .2474 .1234
Sz 3 .0853 .1323 .1922 .1089 .1711 .0841
Sz 4 .0864 .1094 .1083 .1668 .2288 .0735
Big .0195 .0188 .0867 .0393 .1080 .0112
All .0274 .0207 .0804 .0818 .1826 .0422
C. 24-Month Horizon
Small .6764 .5883 .6050 .6827 .7787 .9512
Sz 2 .3462 .5611 .4607 .3235 .7311 .4942
Sz 3 .2127 .2906 .5654 .4657 .3912 .3251
Sz 4 .0777 .1044 .2335 .4412 .5656 .1367
Big .0068 .0029 .0567 .0711 .0294 .0020
All .0133 .0069 .0879 .2232 .2373 .0238
D. 36-Month Horizon
Small .2377 .8484 .8126 .8790 .9045 .6604
Sz 2 .5900 .7436 .5915 .2873 .9004 .6723
Sz 3 .2228 .2365 .4054 .5021 .7577 .3385
Sz 4 .0365 .0586 .0880 .3266 .6654 .0697
Big .0009 .0004 .0077 .0166 .0210 .0001
All .0019 .0013 .0192 .1132 .2718 .0035
Note.—This table shows the significance of sentiment from regression of k-period log returns on
lagged predictive variables. Explanatory variables are a constant, RFx, HB3, TS, DS, DY, Infl, ExMkt,
SMB, HML, UMD, and sentiment. The full data set is 456 observations from 1/1963 to 12/2000. Each
panel has k fewer observations due to construction of long-horizon returns. The p-values are con-
structed from the distribution of the bias-adjusted coefficient estimates obtained by simulation to cor-
rect for problems associated with overlapping observations. See the appendix for additional details.
rtþ1 þ    þ rtþkð Þ=k ¼ a kð Þ þ00 kð Þzt þ b kð ÞSt þ " kð Þt
11. In unreported tables, we also examine the regression R2 and conventional t-statistics
for the long-horizon regression. For R2, the general patterns are that predictability increases
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illustration). Note that we use two-tailed tests, although the alternative
hypothesis justifies one-sided tests. Significance using one-sided tests
are twice as strong as what is reported in the tables.
The pattern of significance basically matches the magnitude of the
coefficients. For larger firms or low book/market firms, sentiment is a
significant predictor of future returns at the 1-, 2-, and 3-year horizon.
Since these portfolios represent most of the market capitalization,12 the
market portfolio is also significantly affected by sentiment (significant
at the 5% level for 1 and 2 years and 1% level for 3 years). That these
portfolios are the ones most influenced by sentiment is interesting in
light of the conventional wisdom that sentiment would most affect
with horizon, although most of the increase comes in moving from 6 to 12 months. Pre-
dictability tends to be lowest for small and low book /market firms, although there is no
monotonic size or book /market relation. If we use Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard
errors to form conventional t-statistics, the overall patterns of significance are similar to those
reported in table 4. We find these t-statistics to be less reliable since the standard errors often
behave poorly. This results in many extreme statistics in the simulation, which make the
empirical critical values large in magnitude (panel A of figure 4). Still, the large size, low
book/market firms, and the overall market portfolio have significant coefficients at the 5–
10% level. These tables are not reported to conserve space but are available upon request.
12. Fama and French (1993, table 1) report that the two portfolios with the stocks in
largest capitalization quintile and lowest two book /market quintiles account for 46% of the
overall market capitalization.
TABLE 5 Joint Significance of Sentiment in Long-Horizon Regressions
Low BM 2 BM 3 BM 4 High All
A. Wald Test for Joint Significance
Small 2.5332 2.0355 1.9559 1.2605 1.7064 1.6520
Sz 2 1.8588 2.0181 3.0433 3.3161 1.6441 2.7889
Sz 3 3.6232 3.0979 2.3201 2.9193 2.1697 3.4967
Sz 4 5.3559 4.4025 4.4228 2.6852 1.6655 4.8433
Big 15.0748 17.7213 8.4798 8.8208 5.9554 20.8386
All 11.9338 13.7749 7.0637 5.0150 2.2370 11.3850
B. p-value for Wald Test
Small .6387 .7292 .7439 .8680 .7896 .7994
Sz 2 .7617 .7324 .5506 .5064 .8008 .5937
Sz 3 .4594 .5416 .6771 .5714 .7046 .4784
Sz 4 .2527 .3543 .3518 .6118 .7970 .3038
Big .0045 .0014 .0755 .0657 .2025 .0003
All .0179 .0080 .1326 .2858 .6923 .0226
Note.—This table shows the joint significance of sentiment from regression of k-period log returns on
lagged predictive variables. Explanatory variables are a constant, RFx, HB3, TS, DS, DY, Infl, ExMkt,
SMB, HML, UMD, and sentiment. The full data set is 456 observations from 1/1963 to 12/2000. Each
panel has k fewer observations due to construction of long-horizon returns. The joint test is across
horizons for a given portfolio. The p-values are constructed from the distribution of the bias-adjusted
coefficient estimates obtained by simulation to correct for problems associated with overlapping
observations. See the appendix for additional details.
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smaller stocks. Perhaps one reason for the lack of significance for smaller
stocks is that the sentiment variable we use applies to the market as a
whole: The newsletters on which our variable is based are forecasts for
the overall market. Therefore, sentiment may affect small stocks more
strongly, but our sentiment data do not allow us to address this. It seems
plausible that growth firms are more influenced by sentiment than value
firms since they typically are more difficult to value. If there are not well-
established valuation benchmarks, then investors may be more likely to
follow the pack.
TABLE 6 Economic Magnitude of Sentiment in Long-Horizon Regressions
Low BM 2 BM 3 BM 4 High All
A. 6-Month Horizon
Small .5580 1.5166 1.5084 0.9147 1.1597 .9698
Sz 2 2.0871 1.6685 1.8598 1.4494 1.0447 2.2535
Sz 3 2.6035 1.9689 1.1192 1.2469 1.0568 2.1000
Sz 4 1.9075 1.6364 1.2719 .7728 .7550 1.6297
Big 1.6593 1.6735 .8795 .7510 .9372 1.0936
All 1.7255 1.7904 1.0025 .6868 .7904 .8842
B. 12-Month Horizon
Small 1.4137 3.0923 2.9851 2.1865 2.4722 2.1549
Sz 2 3.6243 2.9668 3.3072 3.1484 2.3091 3.4177
Sz 3 4.1656 3.0315 2.3690 2.8422 2.6994 3.3520
Sz 4 3.7554 3.1089 2.7753 2.2902 2.1602 3.2161
Big 4.0967 3.7819 2.3628 2.8943 2.5385 3.4354
All 4.0467 3.7774 2.4615 2.4782 2.1979 2.9053
C. 24-Month Horizon
Small 1.7297 1.8664 1.5230 1.1494 .8305 .1937
Sz 2 3.4836 1.6374 1.9368 2.4505 .9027 2.0582
Sz 3 4.0465 2.7858 1.4034 1.7016 2.2740 2.5554
Sz 4 5.3837 4.2942 2.8157 1.7756 1.4065 3.6736
Big 7.0829 7.0181 3.6970 3.4924 4.9492 6.0557
All 6.4738 6.2960 3.3395 2.3852 2.6400 4.6365
D. 36-Month Horizon
Small 5.8000 .7355 .7855 .4652 .3890 1.6052
Sz 2 2.2803 1.0270 1.5739 3.0425 .3713 1.4286
Sz 3 4.4351 3.4877 2.3215 1.7958 .9309 2.7973
Sz 4 7.5741 5.8783 4.7302 2.5601 1.2012 5.1381
Big 11.4787 10.7907 6.2390 5.4918 6.4988 9.6607
All 10.2450 9.3471 5.5354 3.6213 2.9056 7.3289
Note.—This table shows the economic magnitude of a one standard deviation shock to sentiment.
Results are based on bias-adjusted coefficients from regression of k-period log returns on lagged pre-
dictive variables. Explanatory variables are a constant, RFx, HB3, TS, DS, DY, Infl, ExMkt, SMB,
HML, UMD, and sentiment. The full data set is 456 observations from 1/1963 to 12/2000. Each panel
has k fewer observations due to construction of long-horizon returns.
rtþ1 þ    þ rtþkð Þ=k ¼ a kð Þ þ00 kð Þzt þ b kð ÞSt þ " kð Þt
#04463 UCP: JB article # 780201
422 Journal of Business
Since the results across horizons are correlated, it is most appropriate
to judge significance based on a joint test of the coefficients. Table 5
providesWald tests of the null hypothesis that bð6Þ ¼ bð12Þ ¼ bð24Þ ¼
bð36Þ ¼ 0 for a given portfolio. These tests confirm that large and value
stocks are significantly related to sentiment, as is the market portfolio.
To understand the economic magnitude of the coefficients on senti-
ment, it is helpful to refer to table 6. This table takes the bias-adjusted
coefficient and multiplies it by the horizon and the standard deviation of
sentiment (22%). The values in the table indicate the effect of a one
standard deviation increase in sentiment on the return over the indicated
horizon (in percent). For example, a one standard deviation increase in
sentiment is associated with a reduction in the return on the large size,
low book/market portfolio of 7.1% over a 2-year period. The average
(simple) 2-year return for this portfolio is about 25%, so this is an eco-
nomically significant reduction. Moreover, it is not so severe as to be
implausible. Even if institutional investors are aware that future returns
may be reduced by 7%, they may not be willing to try to exploit this
mispricing since this is not an arbitrage opportunity. There is a very real
chance the position may move against them in the interim, and they are
likely to have their performance evaluated before this ‘‘convergence’’
strategy is expected to pay off.
V. Sentiment and Pricing Errors
In this section, we perform two types of analyses to examine the impact
of sentiment on asset valuation. Both analyses rely on the pricing errors
from the Bakshi and Chen (2001) model, which we use to form a market
valuation and model valuation for a quasi-Dow index. The first test is
simply to regress the pricing errors et ¼ ðPt  Pt Þ=Pt (market minus
model) on sentiment and the control variables. The second test exploits
the fact that the market and model valuations should be cointegrated.
A. Pricing Errors Regressions
The simple questionwe have inmind is: Can sentiment explain the pricing
errors? We start by regressing the pricing errors on a constant, sentiment,
and the return on the quasi-Dow:
et ¼ aþ bSt þ dRDow; t þ "t ð3Þ
The last variable is used as a control to pick up misspecification of the
model. For example, if the model inputs, such as earnings growth fore-
casts, are delayed due to reporting lags, the market price might react to
that information before the model. This would show up in both the pricing
error and the return.
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As the pricing errors are highly persistent (autocorrelation of 0.9),
serial correlation in the regression residuals is a problem. We correct for
this serial correlation in three ways. First, we use a Newey and West
(1987) correction with 24 lags. This type of correction may not be ad-
equate when the residuals are highly autocorrelated so we also use the
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and maximum likelihood with AR(1) errors.
The results of these regression are in table 7. The row labeled r
indicates the autocorrelation of the residuals for the Newey-West re-
gression and the estimated autocorrelation coefficient in the other two
regressions. For all three of these regressions, r is 0.89, and the
t-statistics of 29 indicate it is highly significant.13 For simplicity, most
Fig. 4.—Example of distribution of test statistics. This figure shows the distri-
bution of the test statistics from simulation for the value-weighted market portfolio.
Panel A shows the distribution of the t test that the sentiment coefficient is zero for
the 24-month horizon. The solid line is the adjusted statistic from the simulations,
the dash-dotted line is the conventional (unadjusted) statistic, and the dashed line is
a reference normal. Panel B shows the distribution of the joint test that coefficients
on sentiment are zero for all four horizons. The reference c2 distribution with
4 degrees of freedom is also shown for comparison.
13. Additional tests estimating various ARMA( p, q) models for the residuals from or-
dinary least squares indicates the AR(1) specification is appropriate.
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TABLE 7 Dow Pricing Error Analysis
NeweyWest (24 lags) CochraneOrcutt ML AR(1)
Const .6299 (.3155) 992.0765 (1.6475) .0255 (.0085) 62.8978 (.3911) .2537 (.0905) 68.4954 (.4264)
S .1302 (1.8383) .1338 (2.1532) .0854 (3.4560) .0767 (2.8437) .0857 (3.4699) .0780 (2.8993)
RDow .0504 (.2550) 1.1872 (2.5469) .0026 (.0445) .1234 (.6911) .0028 (.0486) .1179 (.6614)
RFx 9.0546 (1.3752) 2.3794 (.5729) 2.4019 (.5785)
HB3 4.3642 (.5060) 1.4280 (.4145) 1.4827 (.4311)
TS .0116 (.8165) .0120 (1.4743) .0115 (1.4154)
DS .1746 (6.1171) .0576 (2.0908) .0584 (2.1343)
DY 8.8921 (3.3788) 7.1731 (2.6379) 6.5361 (2.5339)
CPI 9.9456 (1.6519) .8963 (.5598) .9455 (.5912)
ExMkt 1.7101 (4.4358) .3076 (1.6101) .2896 (1.5315)
SMB .1795 (.4682) .1001 (.7710) .0973 (.7497)
HML .3505 (1.2787) .1628 (1.2870) .1593 (1.2604)
UMD .1611 (.6348) .0427 (.5047) .0440 (.5196)
R .8863 .7530 .8896(29.7311) .9449 (44.0527) .8864 (29.2298) .9419 (42.7924)
R̄2 .0368 .2426 .0421 .0863 .0422 .0840
Note.—This table shows the results of regressing pricing errors for the ‘‘quasi-Dow’’ on sentiment and control variables. Three methods of correcting for the strong auto-
correlation in pricing errors are used: Newey-West with 24 lags, Cochrane-Orcutt, and maximum likelihood with AR(1) residuals. Regressions use 235 observations from January













































of the following discussion focuses on the Cochrane-Orcutt regression
(the maximum likelihood regression is nearly identical). For all three
regressions, the coefficient on sentiment is positive and significant
(t-statistic of 3.5, or 1.8 for the Newey-West regression). The positive
sign is as expected. When investors are optimistic, the market valuation
is higher than the intrinsic value.
The first three regressions leave open the possibility that the senti-
ment variable simply picks up some other rational factors. We therefore
include the set of control variables from the long-horizon regressions,
et ¼ aþ bSt þ dRDow; t þ00zt þ "t ð4Þ
Even in the presence of the control variables, the coefficient on sentiment
is positive and significant in all three regressions (the t-statistic is 2.8, or
2.2 for the Newey-West regression). Although we do not interpret the
control variables individually, they do increase the adjusted R2 and the de-
fault spread and dividend yield enter significantly.
The pricing error regressions show that, even controlling for common
factors associated with rational asset pricing, some mispricing is ex-
plained by investor sentiment. This finding is robust to various forms
of serial correlation correction and alternative regression specifications.
We next explore this issue with another approach to see if we obtain the
same conclusions.
B. Cointegration
In a cointegrated system, two (or more) variables are individually in-
tegrated but a linear combination of those variables is not integrated.We
have a very natural environment for such a system. Since the market
value of an index can be viewed as the sum of permanent shocks (and a
drift), it is reasonable to expect that it is integrated. By the same logic,
the intrinsic (model) value of the index should be integrated as well. Yet,
the difference of the log series should not have permanent components.
That is p  p* should be integrated of order zero, making p and p*
cointegrated with the cointegrating vector ½110. The error correction
interpretation of cointegration says that, when the market is overvalued,
it will adjust toward its equilibrium value based on the sensitivity to the
error p  p*.
In this section, we explore this idea. We first establish that p and p*
are cointegrated, then estimate the error correction representation of the
cointegrating regressions. In these regressions, we include sentiment
and the control variables to see if sentiment can explain any of the de-
viations from intrinsic value.
To test for the integration of p and p*, we estimate augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions including a constant, a time trend,
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and 12 lags of changes to the dependent variable to correct for serial
correlation.14 Panel A of table 8 contains the results for this test. The
null hypothesis of integration is not rejected for p. For p*, the null
hypothesis of integration is rejected at the 10% level, although inte-
gration is not rejected at alternative lag lengths in the ADF test. Given
the strong a priori theoretical reasoning for integration of p*, the fairly
weak evidence against the null hypothesis, and the sensitivity to the
choice of lags, we proceed assuming that the intrinsic value series is
also integrated.
We next test for cointegration in two ways. Given our strong theo-
retical prior on the cointegrating vector, we follow the recommenda-
tion of Hamilton (1994, p. 582) and estimate the ADF regressions for
p  p*. In this regression, a time trend is not included, since the errors
do not appear to drift up over time (see figure 1) and only one lagged
change in the dependent variable is included based on specification
tests (although the results are robust to other lag choices). Panel A
shows that the null of integration is strongly rejected, indicating the
TABLE 8 Tests for Integration and Cointegration
A. ADF Tests
Critical Values
Variable Zt 1% 5% 10%
p 2.1001 3.9942 3.4229 3.1398
p* 3.2709 3.9942 3.4229 3.1398
p  p* 3.8531 3.4456 2.8418 2.5731
pþ q̂p* 3.6782 3.9914 3.4154 3.1359
B. Johansen Tests p  p*
Lags Critical Values
1 2 3 4 1% 5% 10%
Trace 15.0823 17.3196 16.6898 18.8019 19.9349 15.4943 13.4294
Eig 14.6439 16.7486 16.0755 18.1525 18.5200 14.2639 12.2971
Note.—Panel A reports augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the hypothesis that the variable is integrated
of order 1. The ADF regressions for p  p* contains a constant. The other ADF regressions include a
constant and time trend. The ADF regressions for p and p* include 12 lagged changes of the dependent
variable to account for serial correlation. The p  p* and pþ q̂p* regressions include a single lag. The
critical values shown for pþ q̂p* assume q̂ is known. The asymptotic critical values accounting for
the estimation of q are 4.32, 3.78, and 3.50. Tests that fail to reject the null hypothesis indicate the
variable is integrated, so for p  p* and p þ q̂p*, rejection of the null hypothesis indicates cointegration.
Panel B reports the trace and eigenvalue statistics for Johansen’s tests of cointegration using one to four
lags. LR and AIC tests indicate one lag, which BIC suggests two lags are needed. The data are 234
observations from February 1979 through July 1998.
14. In testing for the number of lags, there is evidence that lags 12 and 24 are significant
for p*. We present the more parsimonious regression here, although the tests still fail to re-
ject the null hypothesis with the additional lags.
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two series are cointegrated. We also check our assumption about the
cointegrating vector by rerunning the ADF test using the cointegrating
vector [10.83]’ as estimated in the second column of table 9.15 In this
regression, a time trend is included since this linear combination of p
and p* does trend upward over time. Once again, the null hypothesis of
integration is rejected at the 5% level, meaning the two series are
cointegrated.
The second test of cointegration uses Johansen’s trace and eigenvalue
statistics. The tests are of the null hypothesis that there are zero coin-
tegrating relationships. A rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence
that p and p* are cointegrated. The results of these tests are reported in
panel B of table 9. We report the test for VAR lags from 1 to 4 orders,
although the conclusions are the same in all cases.16 For each lag order
and for either test, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level in favor
of the alternative that p and p* are cointegrated.17
TABLE 9 Cointegration Regressions
Dp Dp*
Const .0060 (1.3621) .0201 (.0205) .0052 (.8108) 3.4344 (2.0220)
S .0006 (4.5498) .0003 (2.1903) .0004 (2.1045) .0003 (1.1945)
RFx .0390 (1.8184) .0440 (1.1653)
HB3 .0512 (2.7996) .0114 (.3496)
TS .0000 (1.0419) .0000 (.3458)
DS .0003 (3.2170) .0002 (1.4117)
DY .0314 (4.0993) .0171 (1.2321)
CPI .0009 (.0924) .0345 (2.0579)
L(ExMkt) .0004 (.8421) .0010 (1.0894)
SMB .0018 (2.1155) .0004 (.2577)
HML .0063 (7.9258) .0057 (3.7019)
UMD .0004 (.6547) .0003 (.2977)
D(p*) .3563 (9.3280) .3122 (9.6831)
D(p) .7728 (9.3280) .9601 (9.6831)
L( p) .0726 (3.4734) .0933 (4.6891) 0.1181 (3.8581) .1226 (3.4384)
L ( p*) .0727 (3.4949) .0775 (4.0623) .1174 (3.8542) .1201 (3.5635)
q 1.0008 0.8300 1.0061 1.0207
R̄2 .3166 .5500 .2818 .3296
Note.—This table shows the results from estimating cointegration regressions with additional ex-
planatory variables. The regressions use 234 observations from February 1979 through July 1998. The
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The cointegrating vector is [1 q] 0. The coefficient on the own-
lagged level is the error correction. L( ) indicates the lag of a variable.
15. The cointegrating vectors for the other regressions in table 9 are not materially different
from [1 1]0, so they are not reported.
16. The likelihood ratio or AIC tests for model order of the VAR indicate one lag is
appropriate. The BIC test favors two lags.
17. We do not report the Johansen test for the null hypothesis of less than one cointegrating
relationship. Rejection of this null hypothesis would mean both variables are I(0). In every
instance, we fail to reject this hypothesis, supporting cointegration of p and p*.
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Having established the cointegration of these series, we then assess
whether sentiment is marginally significant when added to the error
correction version of the cointegrating regression. In particular, we
estimate




t þ g1 pt1 þ q1pt1
 
þ "1; t ð5Þ
and
Dpt ¼ a2 þ b2St þ0
0
2zt þ j2Dpt þ g2 pt1 þ q2pt1
 
þ "2; t ð6Þ
The coefficient g1 represents the correction of ptþ1 to the error pt þ q1pt
and [1 q1] 0 is the cointegrating vector.
The results of these regressions are in table 9. One pair of regressions
excludes the control variables, the other pair includes them.18 The first
two columns are for the regressions with Dp as the dependent variable.
In either case, sentiment is positive and highly significant. This indi-
cates that, when investors are optimistic, the market valuation tends to
be high, controlling for the intrinsic value and (possibly) other variables
to proxy for rational factors.
The last two columns in the table are for the regressions with Dp*
as the dependent variable. Here, the question is whether the sentiment
variable can explain the level of the model valuation. If we could per-
fectly measure sentiment and intrinsic value, we should not find a sig-
nificant relation. Excessive optimism or pessimism should be unrelated
to the intrinsic value. However, a significant relation may indicate our
proxy for intrinsic value is plagued by misspecification, or that we have
not adequately controlled for the rational part of sentiment. The re-
gression without controls shows the sentiment coefficient is negative
and significant, but we already have seen that sentiment captures some
of the information in the control variables. Thus, the negative relation
may simply be due to the information in these control variables, which
should be related to the intrinsic value. When we include the controls in
the regression, there is no longer a significant relation. Therefore, we
conclude that the ability of sentiment to explain pricing errors is driven
by its relation with p and not p*.
In summary, this section attacks from two fronts the issue of whether
sentiment affects the level of asset values. We find strong evidence that
sentiment can explain deviations from intrinsic value even when con-
trolling for rational factors. In addition, we show, in a cointegration
framework, that sentiment is significantly related to the level of market
valuation. In either approach, the results indicate that, when investors are
optimistic, the market valuation often exceeds the intrinsic value.
18. Note that we lag the excess market return by one period, since it can explain almost
all the variation in Dp by construction.
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VI. Robustness
We undertake a host of robustness checks to examine if our results are
driven by some admittedly arbitrary choices. We first consider a variety
of alternative proxies for investor sentiment. Many of these have been
examined previously in the literature, so we seek to show that our var-
iable provides some incremental information. We then consider reason-
able alternatives to the way in which we construct our sentiment variable.
Finally, we discuss some other checks we have done to control for endo-
geneity and to examine robustness to the choice of rational asset pricing
model used to measure pricing errors.
A. Alternative Sentiment Proxies
As discussed in the Introduction, a number of other researchers have
considered alternative proxies for investor sentiment. Although few of
these papers directly explore the valuation and long-horizon issues on
which we concentrate, it is important to provide evidence that our mea-
sure of sentiment is not simply picking up previously documented results.
We consider seven alternative sentiment proxies, several of which
have been used explicitly in this capacity in the literature.19 First, we
consider the discount on closed-end funds (CEFD). The role of this
variable has been the source of considerable controversy, as witnessed
by the paper by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and the response by
Chen, Kan, and Miller (1993). Second, we examine the ratio of NYSE
odd-lot sales to purchases (ODD). Third, we employ net mutual fund
flows (FUNDFLOW), which measure the actual investment behavior of
individual investors. These three variables have also been examined by
Neal and Wheatley (1998) over long horizons, and we compare our
results to theirs.20 FUNDCASH measures the proportion of aggregate
mutual fund assets held as cash. All else equal, bearish fund managers
have large cash positions.21 Next, we consider the ARMS Index, a pop-
ular measure of market sentiment among technical analysts. It is re-
ported daily in theWall Street Journal,which indicates that ‘‘Generally,
an ARMS of less than 1.00 indicates buying demand; above 1.00 in-
dicates selling pressure.’’ Finally, we consider two IPO-related varia-
bles. IPONmeasures the number of IPOs during the month. Ljungqvist,
Nanda, and Singh (2002) suggest firms time their issues during ‘‘hot
markets,’’ which are times of excessive optimism. IPORET is themonthly
average of first-day IPO returns, which has similarly been suggested as a
sentiment measure.
19. To conserve space, we define these variables only briefly here. Interested readers are
referred to Brown and Cliff (2004) for a more complete discussion.
20. Neal and Wheatley (1998) use annual data from 1933 to 1993 for closed-end fund
discounts and from 1960 to 1993 for net mutual fund flows.
21. FUNDCASH is available from only 1970 to 1997, so all analysis involving that var-
iable has 336 observations.
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Table 10 summarizes the three analyses for each of these variables.
The table shows results where the proxies are included in the analysis
one at a time. Results using all proxies simultaneously are not shown in
the table but are discussed here. Panel A shows the economic signifi-
cance of the sentiment proxies from the long-horizon regression anal-
ysis for the small- and large-capitalization portfolios (results for the
value-weighted market are similar to the large stock portfolio and not
included in the table). We find no evidence that the closed-end fund
discount is related to subsequent stock returns. Neal and Wheatley
(1998) find a significant relation for small stocks or a portfolio long in
small stocks and short in large stocks. However, their results are weaker
when also controlling for the average price of small stocks. Consistent
with Neal and Wheatley (1998), we find little evidence that the odd-lot
ratio can predict future returns. For FUNDFLOW, we find a significant
positive relation to future returns on the large-size portfolio. The rela-
tion for the small-size portfolio is also positive but weaker statistically.
The positive coefficient indicates high long-run returns following cash
inflows. Neal and Wheatley (1998) find a significantly negative relation
for the small-size portfolio and the size premium. The sign for their
large-size portfolio is consistent with ours but insignificant. Perhaps
our results differ from Neal and Wheatley (1998) due to the sample
period or our inclusion of additional control variables. Overall, our
results do not provide much support for the view that these variables do
a good job of measuring sentiment.
Several of the other variables in the long-horizon regression are sig-
nificant. FUNDCASH is positively related to the returns on large stocks.
Apparently, as fund managers are holding large cash positions, the
market performs well going forward. The results indicate the IPO
variables are negatively related to small stock returns. IPON is jointly
significant at the 10% level, while IPORET is significant at the 1% level.
Small stocks appear to do poorly following these proxies for hot
markets.
Panel B summarizes the results from the quasi-Dow pricing error
regressions (based on the Cochrane-Orcutt regressions). The first row
of the panel is for regressions without the control variables, the second
row uses the control variables. In every instance, the coefficients are
insignificant.
Panel C shows the sentiment coefficients from the D p portion of
the cointegration analysis. Again, the table shows the results with and
without the control variables. In several cases, the sentiment proxies are
related to pricing errors when the control variables are not included
(ODD, FUNDFLOW, FUNDCASH, and ARMS). However, most of
this evidence appears to be due to common variation with the control
variables. After including the control variables, only FUNDFLOWand
ARMS remain significant.
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TABLE 10 Alternative Sentiment Proxies
CEFD ODD FUNDFLOW FUNDCASH IPON IPORET ARMS
A. Long-Horizon Regressions
6 mo (Small) 1.4959 2.4604 2.7092 1.2966 3.0890 1.9916 2.4601
12 mo (Small) 2.4529 4.9998 1.6039 4.0478 5.8148c 2.3525 1.3366
24 mo (Small) 2.1232 10.9674b 5.2196 1.3095 5.5719 5.8478b .9293
36 mo (Small) 1.6373 13.3465b 6.6440c .3601 10.9886b 5.5024c 1.6855
Joint p (Small) 0.9944 .2136 .0884 .8971 .1010 .0058 .4353
6 mo (Large) .4713 .6749 .8034 4.1447b .4041 .9660 1.2202
12 mo (Large) .0719 2.6242 .3372 9.2635a .6751 1.1662 1.2619
24 mo (Large) 3.6535 2.7463 6.7903a 9.3707b 5.4976c 1.0488 1.0057
36 mo (Large) 7.5271 1.5747 11.2679a 9.9317c 7.6727b .5063 1.2261
Joint p (Large) .8625 .8004 .0001 .0626 .2245 .2903 .4775
B. Pricing Error Analysis
b (no z) .0610 .7745 .2125 .2687 .0191 .0298 .0649
b (with z) .1199 2.0569 .0452 .7127 .0293 .0130 .6206
C. Cointegration Analysis
b (no z) .0003 .0158b .0172a .0037b .0001 .0003 .1735a
b (with z) .0002 .0102 .0130a .0028 .0002 .0000 .1535a
Note.—This table summarizes the key results using alternative measures of sentiment. CEFD is the closed-end fund discount, ODD is the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases,
FUNDFLOW is the net flow of funds into mutual funds, FUNDCASH is the percentage of mutual fund assets held as cash, IPON is the number of IPOs during the month, IPORET
is the first-day return on IPOs during the month, and ARMS is the ARMS Index. Panel A shows the economic magnitude of a one standard deviation increase in sentiment on the
cumulative return over the period for either the small- or large-size quintiles. The panel also shows the p-value for the test of joint significance across horizons. The long-horizon
regressions include control variables, not shown to conserve space, and use the simulations discussed in Appendix A. Panel B shows the coefficient on the sentiment variable in
the pricing error regressions for the quasi-Dow, as in table 7. Panel C reports the sentiment coefficient in the error correction cointegration regression, similar to the Dp columns of
table 9. In panels B and C, the results are reported for regressions with and without the control variables (z). In all panels, a, b, and c superscripts indicate significance at the 1, 5,






































To summarize our findings on the robustness to alternative sentiment
proxies, our survey data do withstand the test. Although several of the
proxies are significant in the long-horizon regressions or the cointe-
gration analysis, none of the proxies exhibits such strong and clear
significance as our survey data. When including all variables together,
our survey data retains its significance.22 There is no denying some
overlap in the information contained in our variable with these other
proxies. However, it appears that our variable effectively captures much
of the common information and also provides incremental explanatory
power.
B. Construction of the Sentiment Variable
The next issue we address is whether our construction of the sentiment
variable drives the results. Unfortunately, there is no theoretically cor-
rect way of formulating a sentiment index from the survey data on the
fractionBullish, Bearish, andNeutral. Our choice of the Bull-Bear spread
is based solely on its popularity among technical analysts and the fi-
nancial press. Consequently, we define four other measures based on the
same underlying survey data. First, we consider the fraction of Bulls to
those with an opinion, Bull/(Bull + Bear). Second, we consider a pair of
measures, Neutral and Bull-Bear. By including Neutral as a second
variable, we can distinguish between cases where there is indifference
and cases where there is strong disagreement (e.g., the Bull-Bear spread
is the same if all investors are Neutral or bulls and bears are split 50/50).
Third, we consider usingNeutral/(Bull + Bear) and the Bull-Bear spread.
Scaling Neutral in this way puts more emphasis on the observations with
extreme neutrality. Finally, we split the Bull-Bear spread into positive
and negative values. We discuss this in the next subsection, so we skip it
here.
The results of the three analyses are summarized in table 11. Panel A
shows that all variants of bullish sentiment remain significant in the
long-horizon regressions. For the two cases with a version of neutrality,
there is little evidence that neutrality is significant. The Cochrane-Orcutt
22. We explore two ways of using the various proxies simultaneously. First, we repeat the
three analyses by simply using the survey data and all proxies at once. In the long-horizon
regression, our sentiment variable remains significant. In the pricing error analysis, the survey
sentiment variable remains significant with or without the control variables. None of the other
proxies is significant in either regression. The survey sentiment variable is also significant in
the cointegration analysis, although several other proxies are significant as well (CEFD, ODD,
FUNDFLOW, IPON, and ARMS). The second approach is to regress survey sentiment on the
proxies and rerun each analysis first with the fitted value from the regression, then with the
regression residuals. The fitted value picks up the common variation between the survey data
and the other proxies, while the residual contains the information in the survey data incre-
mental to the other proxies. The fitted value is significant in the long-horizon regression and the
cointegration analysis but insignificant in the pricing error regressions. The residual is sig-
nificant in the pricing error regressions but not the cointegration analysis or the long-horizon
regressions.
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regressions of quasi-Dow pricing errors are in panel B. Again, all versions
of bullish sentiment remain significant and the neutrality variables are in-
significant. Finally, panel C shows the results for the market mispric-
ing part of the cointegration. The significance of the bullish sentiment
variables remains intact, but there is some weak evidence that high
TABLE 11 Robustness to Construction of Sentiment
A. Long-Horizon Regressions
Case Variable 6 mos. 12 mos. 24 mos. 36 mos.
1 Bull /(Bull + Bear) .8726 2.8862b 4.6066b 7.2759a
2 Neutral .8037 1.6023 3.6765c 2.5574
2 Bull-Bear .7167 2.5236c 3.8625c 6.7593a
3 Neutral /(Bull + Bear) .4146 .8782 2.5927 2.4425
3 Bull-Bear .8361 2.7316c 4.2397b 6.9181a
4 S+ 1.0165 2.1246 4.7556a 7.2758a
4 S .1891 1.1768 .0515 .2703
B. Pricing Error Analysis
No z With z
Coeff. t-Statistric Coeff. t-Statistic
1 Bull /(Bull + Bear) 12.5139 3.2206 11.0963 2.5997
2 Neutral .0505 .8373 .0127 .1962
2 Bull-Bear .0916 3.5492 .0788 2.7503
3 Neutral /(Bull + Bear) 2.9410 .9066 .7199 .2069
3 Bull-Bear .0918 3.5706 .0790 2.7556
4 Sþ .0735 2.0503 .0787 2.1616
4 S .1024 2.3001 .0733 1.5327
C. Cointegration Analysis
No z With z
Coeff. t-Statistic Coeff. t-Statistic
1 Bull /(Bull + Bear) .0820 4.3754 .0439 2.1262
2 Neutral .0005 1.4914 .0006 2.0461
2 Bull-Bear .0006 4.7976 .0003 2.2296
3 Neutral /(Bull + Bear) .0242 1.3042 .0282 1.6814
3 Bull-Bear .0006 4.7394 .0003 2.2237
4 Sþ .0004 2.0916 .0002 1.3436
4 S .0008 2.5686 .0004 1.3925
Note.—This table summarizes the key results when using four methods of constructing sentiment.
Case 1 uses the percentage Bullish divided by the percentage with a view (Bullish plus Bearish). Case 2
uses two variables, the percentage Neutral and the Bull-Bear spread. Case 3 uses the percentage Neutral
divided by the percentage with a view, along with the Bull-Bear spread. Case 4 splits the sentiment
measure into positive and negative values. Panel A shows the economic magnitude of a one standard
deviation increase in sentiment on the cumulative return on the value-weighted market over the period.
The a, b, and c superscripts indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The long-
horizon regressions include control variables, not shown to conserve space, and use the simulations
discussed in the appendix. Panel B shows the sentiment coefficients and t-statistics based on the
Cochrane-Orcutt quasi-Dow pricing error regressions, similar to table 7. Panel C shows the sentiment
coefficients and t-statistics from the cointegration analysis, as in the Dp columns of table 9. In panels B
and C, the first two columns are without the control variables (z), the last two columns include the
control variables.
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neutrality is related to drops in the market. In particular, for the regres-
sion using Neutral and Bull-Bear and including the control variables the
t-statistic on the neutrality coefficient is2.04. Replacing Neutral with
Neutral /(Bull + Bear) reduces the t-statistic to 1.68.
In summary, it does not appear that our choice of defining sentiment as
the Bull-Bear spread drives our results. Any combination of two of the
three categories of optimism produces similar results.23 It is probably
possible to construct variables using the Bull/Bear/Neutral information
that performs ‘‘better’’ than our simple Bull-Bear spread. However, our
goal is not to fish for the variable(s) that best explains the data (in the
sample) but to show that our results are robust to this choice.
C. Asymmetric Response to Optimism and Pessimism
Empirical evidence on momentum and reversals (see, for example,
Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000) as well as implications of the behavioral
theories suggest that the importance of sentiment may be asymmetric.
One reason for this has to do with limits to arbitrage. Practical limita-
tions to short-selling activity may make it difficult for rational investors
to prevent market prices from being pushed above their intrinsic value
during periods of excessive optimism. On the other hand, when some
investors are especially pessimistic, no similar frictions prevent arbi-
trageurs from taking the necessary long position.24 A second source of
asymmetry has to do with the direct implication of the DHS model that
overconfidence drives investors to overreact to private information.
Overvaluation (undervaluation) tends to follow a string of good (bad)
news. Gervais and Odean (2001) show that, because investors are net
long in equities, aggregate overconfidence tends to occur following gains.
Taken together, these implications suggest an asymmetric relation be-
tween sentiment and valuations.25
Case 4 in table 11 provides some evidence on this issue by splitting
S into positive (Sþ) and negative (S) values. Panel A shows the long-
horizon regression results for the value-weighted market portfolio.
The negative part of sentiment is insignificant, but the positive part is
significant at the 1% level at the 24- and 36-month horizons. The joint
test of all eight coefficients (not reported in the table) is significant, with
a p-value of 0.0368. Panel B shows that, in the pricing error regression,
23. We also consider the three pairwise combinations of Bull, Bear, and Neutral. Single
variables at a time do not work as reliably and all three cannot be used simultaneously, since
they are related by an identity.
24. Short-sale constraints are not a necessary condition for the DHS, BSV, or DSSW
models, since risk alone may make investors unwilling to sell short even if they are able to
do so.
25. Such an asymmetric relation is not necessarily evidence of a behavioral model. For
example, Veronesi (1999) has a rational model where a piece of news has more price impact
if it refutes inferences about the current state.
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the positive part of sentiment is statistically significant with or without
the control variables. The evidence on the negative part of sentiment is
more questionable. Without the control variables, it is significant. How-
ever, when controlling for common information, negative sentiment
is no longer significant. The evidence from the cointegration analysis
(panel C) is weaker. Both variables are significant for the regression
without controls, but become insignificant when including the control
variables. Overall, these results are consistent with the asymmetric pat-
terns predicted by the behavioral theories.
D. Other Robustness Checks
We offer brief comments on other robustness checks we have done. One
concern is that the endogeneity between sentiment and market valu-
ations may influence our pricing error regressions. For example, if bad
news comes out during the month, prices may drop and investors may
reduce their optimism. Both adjustments potentially come in response
to an exogenous shock, and the new market price and new sentiment
level are presumably determined together. We address this issue by sim-
ply modifying the orthogonality conditions in the regressions. Specif-
ically, we replace the usual condition from the normal equations that
says Eð"t  StÞ ¼ 0 with Eð"t  St1Þ ¼ 0. The main results are insen-
sitive to this change.
We also examine robustness to the valuation model used to form
pricing errors. We have pricing errors on the S&P 500 Index from both
the Bakshi and Chen (2001) and Sharpe (2002) models.26 In each case,
these data start in 1983. These tests (not reported in tables) provide evi-
dence that our Dow results are not simply picking up misspecification
of the valuation model. The pricing error regressions, as in table 7,
have significant coefficients on sentiment for either set of S&P pricing
errors. When repeating the cointegration analysis of tables 8 and 9,
the sentiment coefficient in the market mispricing regressions is sig-
nificant for either set of pricing errors when the control variables are
not included. When adding the control variables, the Bakshi and Chen
(2001) S&P errors are no longer significantly related to sentiment, al-
though this result is hard to interpret since these pricing errors failed
the cointegration test diagnostic.27 Results from the Sharpe model re-
main significant. Since our results are largely robust to both an alterna-
tive index and an alternative valuation model, we feel our evidence is
more suggestive of picking up market misvaluation rather than model
misspecification.
26. We thank Steve Sharpe for kindly sharing these data with us. The pricing errors in the
published version of his paper are quarterly, but he provided a monthly sample.
27. The S&P pricing errors from the Bakshi and Chen (2001) model fail the test for
cointegration. The Sharpe (2002) errors pass the cointegration tests.
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VII. Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a direct survey measure of investor sentiment
predicts market returns over the next 1–3 years and this measure has the
ability to explain deviations from intrinsic value as measured by other
researchers’ models of stock prices. In all cases, the significance of our
results is robust to controlling for rational factors and to changes in the
methodology.
There are (at least) two ways to interpret these findings. The more
conservative interpretation is that we have identified some new factor
related to asset valuation. This factor may be derived from investors’
rational outlook for the market or from some other origin altogether, for
example, unidentified risk factors. Regardless of the interpretation, our
sentiment variable forecasts market returns over the next several years
and helps to explain mispricings from a rigorous valuation model.
The bolder interpretation is that we actually used an accurate measure
of investor sentiment and this measure is related to the level of stock
prices. This finding has several important implications. First and fore-
most, our results support the important yet controversial behavioral
theories that predict the irrational sentiments of investors do in fact af-
fect asset price levels. Second, this suggests asset pricing models should
consider the role of investor sentiment. Third, market regulators and
government officials should be concerned about the potential for mar-
ket bubbles or ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ if a sudden change in sentiment
translates into a negative wealth shock that depresses economic activity.
Finally, individual investors should be aware of the impact sentiment
can have on both their own and money managers’ investment strategies.
Appendix
Simulation Details
We regress k-period returns on sentiment and control variables,
rtþ1 þ    þ rtþkð Þ=k ¼ a kð Þ þ b kð ÞSt þ0
0
kð Þzt þ " kð Þtþk : ð7Þ
Here, rtþ1 is the log return from month t to t þ 1 and zt is the vector of predic-
tive variables known at time t. The use of overlapping observations induces a
MAðk  1Þ structure in the residuals under the null that "ð1Þ is serially uncorrelated.
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) propose a correction for this induced correlation.
Two main problems are associated with the regression in (7). First, there is a bias
in the coefficient estimates, since they include persistent independent variables that
are predetermined but not strictly exogenous. Second, Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
standard errors do not perform well when the degree of overlap is ‘‘large’’ relative to
the sample size. Therefore, we perform a simulation to account for the bias and
adjust the critical values used in inference.
#04463 UCP: JB article # 780201
437Investor Sentiment and Asset Valuation
The simulation estimates a VAR(1) for yt ¼ ½rt S tz
0
t’.
28 The null hypothesis that
sentiment does not predict returns is imposed on the coefficient matrix by setting the
appropriate element to zero. The constant in the constrained model is adjusted to
restore the original mean, and the residuals from the constrained model are saved.
We bootstrap the residuals from the calibration regressions to account for hetero-
scedasticity and generate and discard an additional 100 observations to remove any
startup effects. At each replication, the 456 simulated observations are used to form
long-horizon returns and estimate (7) at each of the horizons. The coefficients at
iteration i are saved along with the corresponding Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
standard errors. This process is repeated for 10,000 artificial data sets to get a dis-
tribution of the values of b̂ðkÞ.
We calculate t-statistics for the test that bðkÞ ¼ 0 by subtracting the bias and
dividing by the standard deviation of the coefficient estimates. That is, the t-statistic
at the ith iteration for horizon k is
t i kð Þ ¼ b̂
i kð Þ  b̂i kð Þ
std b̂i kð Þ
  ;
where b̂iðkÞ and std ½ b̂iðkÞ indicate the mean and standard deviation of the val-
ues of b̂iðkÞ across the 10,000 simulations. We find that t-statistics constructed in
this fashion perform much better than those obtained by using the standard error
of the coefficient.
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration for the value-weighted market return.
Panel A shows the distribution of t-statistics for the sentiment coefficient over the
10,000 simulations under the null hypothesis. The solid line represents the simulation-
adjusted t-statistics (used throughout the long-horizon regression analysis in the text).
Test statistics formed in this way adhere very closely to the normal distribution (dashed
line). Also shown in panel A are conventional t-statistics (i.e., using Hansen and
Hodrick 1980 standard errors and without adjusting for bias). These t-statistics are
obviously negatively biased and also have an extremely thick left tail. For example, the
conventional t-statistics fall below1.96 13.62% of the time, compared to 2.37% for
the adjusted t-statistics and 2.50% for a standard normal variable. The empirical dis-
tribution of the t-statistics provides small sample critical values for inference. Each of
the 36 portfolios has its own simulation for bias and size adjustments.
Panel B of the figure shows the distribution of the joint test of significance across
the four horizons. These tests estimate the covariance matrix of the vector of coef-
ficients b̂ ¼ b b̂ð6Þ b̂ð12Þ b̂ð24Þ b̂ð36Þc0 as the covariance (across the 10,000 simu-
lations) of b̂i. The joint test conforms closely to the reference c2 distribution with
4 degrees of freedom.
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